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This book makes no secret of writing from the perspective of an artist on the current practice of art.  As its title suggests, the mode of address of This is Not Art is essentially corrective, which is an unusual way for artists to talk to one another.  Consequently, it sometimes comes across as somewhat didactic, although this is balanced by a sense of modesty that is identified with the autodidacticism of the artist.  From the point of view of a critic, theorist or historian, one feels somewhat excluded from the discussion, since one is not really being addressed, but nevertheless one feels implicated by the nature of the questions of theory that are raised.  
	The central figure of the book is that of the artist, and the problem addressed is that of her position and potential for resistance within the wider structures of the artworld and contemporary capitalist ideology.  The first two chapters of the book establish this position, first through an account of neoliberalism and then through the institutional definition of art as it has been developed in analytical philosophy from Danto to Dickie.  There is a potential contradiction between the ahistoricity of the latter and the historical determination of the former, which could perhaps have been mediated by an historical account of the institution of art such as Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde.  What is really at stake, however, in this first part of the book is the identity and value of art.  Jelinek’s complaint in the first chapter is that the ideology of the free market determines the value, in all senses, of art.  One might then have expected to read in the second chapter that this wider, historically determined, ideology also conditions the definition of art in its institutionalized sense, so that the definition of art, which it is the function of the artworld to determine, is itself overdetermined by the definition of art as a commodity.  And yet Jelinek makes a claim for the validity of the institutional theory of art in its own terms, as a necessary detour into a more abstract realm.  It is as if Jelinek, interested in the relation between art and politics, has first asked the separate questions ‘what determines politics’ and ‘what determines art’ in succession, paratactically.  What is established in the first two chapters are thus two modes of totalizing determination—one describing the extension of neoliberal capitalist ideology into all areas of life, and the other the internalized and tautologous relationship between the institution and its object—that are not necessarily compatible.  Bringing them together runs the risk of undermining the coherence of each, and Jelinek only partially succeeds in clarifying what the relationship between these two perspectives might be, although the argument that the artworld unwittingly reproduces, in its own workings, the wider capitalist ideology, or that it thinks it is saying and doing one thing whereas in reality it is saying and doing something else, does have genuine critical validity.  (One should point out, however, that the argument concerning art and political economy is deserving of a more dialectical treatment, which would, for example, involve a more extended engagement than Jelinek allows with Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s extraordinary recent book The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005).)
	In the second part of the book, Jelinek addresses the questions of the subject and the possibility of action that follow from the two modes of determination identified in the first part.  Michel Foucault provides the main authority for the workings of power in the art world, but also for a sense of possible agency centred on the individual, which is contrasted with a Marxist ‘class’ theory of power.  The characterization of Marxism is, however, too one-dimensional for this contrast to be convincing.  The intention here is to criticize simplistic ‘us’ and ‘them’ oppositions in descriptions of the workings of power, but to characterize Marxism according to the same simplistic oppositions, even if these are not Jelinek’s own views but those she attributes to the ‘critical’ artworld, does not in itself provide a valid basis for its rejection.  The appeal to Foucault as providing a more nuanced sense of power proceeds directly upon this rejection, and one can see why, given her description in chapter 1, Jelinek thinks Foucault’s definition of power as multiple and constituted in the subject better describes the more subtly interiorized forms of power of neoliberal capitalism.  However, in Foucault, the possibility of resistance is itself circumscribed by power, which sets the terms, and this means that there can be no position of exteriority with respect to it, except, in the term that appears in his later work, that represented by the ‘self’.  One of the criticisms made of Foucault, and hence a criticism that could be levelled at this book, is that because resistance is defined only in relation to a conception of power defined as multiple, it can only be itself multiple, individual rather than collective, and not staged in relation to a social totality. 
	The playing out of the opposition between art and life provides one example of how power in the form of neoliberal ideology prescribes the terms of its own resistance.  Jelinek is critical of avant-garde attempts to negate the separation of art from life, a contemporary form of which can be seen in participatory and socially engaged art practices that seek to work in or with ‘real’ situations.  The problem is that the value attached to such practices is determined by the ‘reality’ concerned and not by art, which for Jelinek means that it unwittingly tends to reproduce the values of the dominant ideology.  In response to this situation the last chapter argues for a renewed separation of art from life, centred on the reduction of art to a ‘discipline’.  This is partly to protect art as a discipline from other activities with which it may be confused, such as education and political activism.  Thus, having stated what is not art, This is Not Art states what art is.  Art is a ‘knowledge-forming discipline’, and is like any other academic discipline, such as anthropology, which is the discipline from which Jelinek borrows some of her terminology.  It produces knowledge, and is defined by rules that govern its working.  It also has its own canon of works.  However, Jelinek seems not to notice that knowledge is transitive—that it is necessarily of something.  A knowledge-producing practice may well involve a knowledge of its own works and workings (which is how Jelinek characterizes it) but this is finally not what it is aiming at.  Perhaps the knowledge that art produces can be of any aspect of the world whatsoever, and it is rather the means of knowing that distinguishes it from all other disciplines.  This is possibly what Jelinek means when she says of art that it produces ‘stories’—that the discipline of art is distinguished by the status of its knowledge as fiction.  But this would seem to make it a very different kind of discipline than, say, anthropology, which is not about any aspect of the world whatsoever but has a definite object of knowledge (whatever one thinks of what ‘humanity’ is) that defines it as a discipline.  Although Jelinek does not mean it in a Greenbergian way, there is nevertheless a sense in which her notion of a discipline is ‘modernist’ in the sense of believing in specialization, and the term itself also implies the notion of tradition, and even mastery.  There is a curious homology, given the antipathy to Clement Greenberg’s art criticism that surfaces throughout the book, between the assertions that art should maintain its value in disciplinary terms and that the function of the avant-garde is to ‘keep culture moving in the midst of ideological confusion and violence’ (Greenberg).
Although Jelinek frequently acknowledges that complex discourses are being simplified for the sake of argument, the summary dismissal of major bodies of thought (such as Marxism) is often frustrating.  There are also a few errors in the book.  To take one, and to stay for a moment longer with Greenberg, it is perhaps an understandable mistake to refer to his classic 1939 essay ‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch’ (from which the quotation at the end of the last paragraph comes) as ‘Art and Kitsch’, and most people would think it is to stretch things a bit too far to refer to him as an analytical philosopher, but it is a serious misrepresentation to say that he dismisses working-class craft and folk art as ‘kitsch’.  In fact, the word ‘kitsch’ was used by Greenberg to refer to an ‘ersatz’ culture mass-produced for an urban audience, which was, at the time he was writing, ‘wiping out folk culture’.​[1]​  It is not gratuitously pedantic to point this out, since the issue of who produces culture and from what position of economic power is central to the argument of the book.












^1	  Clement Greenberg, ‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch’ (1939), in Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 12. 
^2	  Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 350.
